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INTRODUCTION: THE NEUROBIOLOGY
OF THE WILL
The will is a complex set of cognitive
(including affective and motivational) and
motor capacities that enable us to initiate
and complete action plans. Neurological
and psychiatric disorders impair these
capacities because of dysfunction in neu-
ral circuits mediating them. Parkinson’s
disease (PD), major depressive disor-
der (MDD), obsessive-compulsive disor-
der (OCD), and other conditions can
be understood as disorders of the will
involving overactive, underactive or inac-
tive critical nodes of these circuits (Lozano
and Lipsman, 2013). Neural prosthe-
ses such as brain-computer interfaces
(BCIs), hippocampal prostheses (HPs),
and deep-brain stimulation (DBS) can
bypass, replace, or modulate damaged or
dysfunctional circuits and thereby restore
or enhance the capacities necessary to
translate intentions into actions. In this
respect, they can be described as prosthe-
ses for the will.
Philosophers claim that for the will to
be free, actions must not be generated by
causal routes that bypass and undermine
agent’s control of the mental states that
issue in them (Mele, 1995). Presumably,
this would include manipulation of the
brain by an artificial implanted device.
Yet neural prostheses that bypass, replace,
or modulate dysfunctional circuits do not
undermine but instead restore this control
when it has been lost and can enhance it
when it is impaired by brain injury or neu-
rodegeneration. They restore control of
thought and behavior by restoring the rel-
evant motor and mental functions. I will
describe the different respects in which the
three neural prostheses in question can
achieve this goal.
BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES:
RESTORATION OF MOTOR FUNCTION
BCIs utilize operant conditioning and
goal-directed thinking in restoring some
degree of motor function. As motor pros-
theses, they can enable some individu-
als with paralysis caused by traumatic
brain injury, neurodegenerative disease, or
limb loss to move a cursor on a com-
puter screen or a robotic arm by detect-
ing signals in the motor cortex associated
with intending to perform these actions.
These systems may involve macroelec-
trodes placed on the scalp and connected
to an EEG, electrodes implanted subdu-
rally or epidurally, or a microelectrode
array implanted in the motor cortex. What
causes the cursor or robotic arm to move
is the mental act of forming and executing
an intention by the person manipulating
the interface. BCIs may also enable those
with disorders of consciousness or locked-
in syndrome who retain a high level
of cognitive functioning to reliably com-
municate their wishes about continuing
or discontinuing life-sustaining treatment
when they cannot communicate behav-
iorally. Difficulties with learning how to
manipulate BCIs, sustaining attention to
the task at hand, and the semantic capac-
ity necessary to communicate for those
with cognitive impairment are some of the
challenges presented by this technology
(Birbaumer et al., 2014). Whether a per-
son using such a system can translate his
or her thoughts into actions may depend
on the extent of brain injury, which cor-
tical circuits are intact, and how effective
the practitioner is in training the patient to
operate the interface. The extent to which
the patient can do this successfully, and
thus the extent to which he or she can exer-
cise the motor component of the will, can
be a matter of degree.
HIPPOCAMPAL PROSTHESES:
RESTORATION OF MEMORY ENCODING
HPs to restore the cognitive function of
memory have been used as prototypes
in animal models but have not yet been
used in humans. While they are at the
developmental stage and may be ready for
implantation in the human brain in the
next 5 years, they remain a hypothetical
intervention. Electrical stimulation of the
fornix, which projects to a circuit consist-
ing of the hippocampus and entorhinal
cortex, improved semantic, working, and
procedural memory in at least one person
in a Phase I trial for early-stage Alzheimer’s
disease (Laxton et al., 2010). For those
with this or other dementias whose hip-
pocampal degeneration is too advanced to
respond to neurostimulation, or for those
with anterograde amnesia from traumatic
injury to the hippocampal-entorhinal cir-
cuit, an HP replacing it might be able to
restore the ability to encode new mem-
ories and learn and retain information
(Berger et al., 2011; Hampson et al., 2013).
It would do this by re-establishing inputs
and outputs in this circuit. This structure
is a component of the episodic memory
system and one of the first structures to
undergo cellular loss and tau pathology in
Alzheimer’s disease. Artificial reconstruc-
tion of neuron-to-neuron connections
with a biomimetic microchip model
replacing the hippocampal-entorhinal
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circuit could improve and sustain seman-
tic, working, and procedural memory in
those with degeneration in brain regions
mediating memory and enable them
to continue performing cognitive and
physical functions. Memory provides
a cognitive basis on which to imagine
counterfactual and possible courses of
action in the present and future (Hassabis
et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). It
thus plays a critical role in deliberation
and decision-making. A prosthesis that
could resolve anterograde amnesia by re-
establishing the ability to encode, consol-
idate, and retrieve episodic memory could
restore planning and decisional capacity
and restore one component of the will.
Theoretically, it would not matter
whether memory functions were main-
tained by a natural or artificial system,
provided that the prosthesis connected in
the right way with the neural inputs and
outputs necessary for these functions. To
a certain extent, memory retrieval is an
involuntary process. We have some degree
of control of this process insofar as we
can make some episodic memories con-
sciously accessible and use the information
in working memory for immediate cog-
nitive demands and in prospective mem-
ory to plan ahead. But memories that
flooded our brains with information serv-
ing no such purpose could be a bur-
den and an impediment to free action.
Device makers and practitioners implant-
ing and activating an HP would have to
ensure that circuits mediating the encod-
ing, consolidation and retrieval of episodic
memory were neither underactive nor
overactive. They would also have to ensure
that the device integrated with adjacent
circuits in the medial temporal lobes
and did not interfere with nondeclarative
memory systems such as striatum- and
cerebellum-mediated procedural memory
and amygdala- and brainstem-mediated
emotional context memory. In addition,
the encoding function of an HP would
have to be compatible with the meaning
the agent assigns to past events andmemo-
ries of them. This meaning influences how
the agent imagines future situations and
forms action plans. Prostheses would not
assign meaning to newly formed memo-
ries but would encode them with equal
value-neutral weight. This could impair
goal-directed behavior if it interfered with
the person’s capacity to select some past
events as more valuable than others in
deliberating about courses of action. The
encoding of newmemories by the prosthe-
sis would have to complement meaning-
ful long-term memories that already have
been encoded and consolidated and are
available for retrieval. So the HPwould not
only have to integrate with other circuits in
the person’s brain but also with his or her
history as an agent with a past and future.
DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION:
RESTORATION OF MOTOR AND
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS
DBS has the widest range of applica-
tions among neural prostheses, restoring
or enhancing motor as well as cogni-
tive functions. It can be used as both
as a probe and modulator of activity in
dysfunctional neural circuits implicated
in neurological and psychiatric disorders
(Lozano and Lipsman, 2013). DBS has
confirmed the pathophysiology of PD as
degeneration of dopaminergic structures
in the nigro-striatal pathway of the basal
ganglia. Unilateral or bilateral stimula-
tion of the subthalamic nucleus (STN)
or globus pallidus interna (GPi) have
restored circuit integrity and resulted in
significant improvement for many patients
with PD and other movement disor-
ders such as primary dystonia and essen-
tial tremor in their ability to perform
voluntary bodily movements. While the
technique is still experimental and inves-
tigational for psychiatric disorders, DBS
has confirmed that dysfunction in brain-
stem dopaminergic structures such as the
ventral tegmental area (VTA) associated
with motivation and reward is implicated
in depression with symptoms of anhe-
donia and avolition. Stimulation of the
nucleus accumbens, which receives projec-
tions from the VTA, has resulted in relief
of these symptoms in some patients whose
depression had been resistant to phar-
macological treatment (Schlaepfer et al.,
2008). By restoring their capacity to con-
sider and engage in pleasurable activ-
ities, DBS can restore one component
of their will. In addition, because of
its projections to frontal-striatal pathways
mediating cognitive, affective, and motor
functions, stimulation of the STN can
modulate dysfunction in these pathways
and release individuals with OCD from
paralyzing obsessions and compulsions
(Mallet et al., 2008).
The neuromodulating effects of DBS
can re-establish and sustain optimal levels
of neural function, preventing extremes of
deficit and surfeit and promoting flexible
behavior and adaptability to the environ-
ment. Overstimulating targeted circuits, or
inadvertently stimulating the wrong cir-
cuits, in an attempt to release mental and
physical constraints caused by one type
of neuropathology could cause a differ-
ent type and have an equally disabling
effect on the will. In PD, for exam-
ple, electrical stimulation of the STN or
GPi can resolve hypodopaminergic activ-
ity causing motor, cognitive, and emo-
tional inhibition. But imprecise stimu-
lation or overstimulation of these brain
regions may induce hyperdopaminergic
activity and produce behavioral disinhi-
bition and impulsive or addictive behav-
ior (Castrioto et al., 2014). The ethical
implications of altering brain circuits with
this technique in terms of benefit and
harm are evident in reports of Parkinson’s
patients experiencing both symptom relief
and neurological and psychological seque-
lae (Muller and Christen, 2011; Christen
et al., 2012). Motor and emotional effects
of stimulating the STN or GPi can be
difficult to dissociate because the basal
ganglia include these motor nodes as
well as limbic nodes. There is consider-
able overlap between them, with affer-
ent inputs and efferent outputs regulated
by the same neurotransmitter. Similarly,
in MDD overstimulation of an underac-
tive nucleus accumbens associated with
anhedonia and avolition can cause hyper-
dopaminergic effects in the reward cir-
cuitry and result in pathological behavior
in the form of euphoria, hypomania, and
mania (Synofzik et al., 2012). The cost-
benefit ratio of DBS for depression and
other psychiatric disorders is still unclear.
The increasing use of this and other
brain-invasive technologies raises ethical
questions because not all outcomes are
positive. A recent study of DBS of the
reward system for MDD showed promis-
ing results within a few days of stimu-
lation at lower intensities. As in earlier
studies, however, surgical risks such as
intracerebral hemorrhage and psychiatric
complications such as suicidal ideation
and hypomania in some subjects, as well
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as the high cost, were among the nega-
tive aspects of the technique (Schlaepfer
et al., 2014). Some sequelae are not fore-
seeable, and it cannot be predicted which
patients will experience them. This under-
scores the fact that this type of neuromod-
ulation for psychiatric disorders remains
experimental and investigational. Neural
targets of DBS must be carefully selected
and stimulation parameters adjusted in
response to brain changes and neurologi-
cal and psychiatric symptoms to maintain
optimal levels of neural and mental
function. Stimulation must sustain the
neural and psychological mean between
extremes.
Technological advances such as closed-
loop feedback devices that can monitor
and adjust to changes in the brain while
circuits are stimulated can reduce the inci-
dence of adverse effects. This would make
them more tailored to individualized ther-
apy in maximizing benefit andminimizing
harm regarding the capacity to think and
act. A recent study demonstrating positive
outcomes from DBS at an early stage of
PD suggests that it might have similar out-
comes in treating psychiatric disorders if
the effects on neural circuits are similar
(Schuepbach et al., 2013). Electrical stim-
ulation of dysfunctional circuits at an early
stage of degeneration could strengthen
synaptic connectivity, release trophic fac-
tors and possibly induce neurogenesis.
This would be especially welcome in light
of previous studies indicating that DBS for
advanced neurodegenerative disorders can
relieve symptoms but not alter the under-
lying pathology and disease progression.
Even if DBS or other neural prostheses
failed to arrest neurodegeneration, they
might be able to delay or prevent further
degeneration and enable patients affected
by these disorders to retain some degree
of control of their behavior by sustain-
ing a certain level of cognitive and motor
functions for longer periods.
CONCLUSION
The ability of DBS to modulate underac-
tive and overactive circuits in neurological
and psychiatric disorders can restore or
enhance the physical and mental capac-
ities composing the will. Although their
range of applications is more limited,
BCIs and HPs could bypass or replace
dysfunctional pathways in cortical and
subcortical areas mediating motor con-
trol and dysfunctional pathways in the
medial temporal lobes mediating episodic
memory. A BCI may restore the will to
some degree by enabling individuals par-
alyzed from brain or spinal cord injuries
to translate their thoughts into certain
actions and communicate their wishes
about medical treatment. An HP replacing
a damaged hippocampal-entorhinal cir-
cuit might enable individuals to learn and
retain information necessary for present
cognitive tasks and future planning. These
considerations about the neurobiological
basis of the will and the effects of alter-
ing it show that there is much in common
between neuroscience and philosophy and
that each discipline can inform and be
informed by the other. In different respects
and in varying degrees, the three pros-
theses I have discussed can re-establish
and sustain the structural and functional
integrity of the brain circuits necessary for
freely willed actions.
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